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The Costs of Agencies:
Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment
in the Administrative State
Kermit Roosevelt

In 1987, Cheryl Churchill lost her job for cnticizmg her employer.
Churchill was a public employee holding a probationary nursing position in the
obstetrics department of McDonough Hospital in Macomb, Illinois. Alleging
that the termination violated her First Amendment rights, she sued the hospital
and her supervisor, Cynthia Waters, in federal court. In 1994, her case reached
the Supreme Court. 1 The Court held that First Amendment analysis should be
applied not to Churchill's actual speech but to what the hospital administrators
might reasonably have thought she said.2 Because that speech "may have
substantially dampened" a fellow employee's interest in working for the
obstetrics department, 3 the Court explained, it was sufficiently disruptive to
fall outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. Regardless of what
Churchill had actually said, if the administrators were sincere and reasonable
in their belief, they were entitled to summary judgment. 4
Waters represents the Supreme Court's latest word on the First
Amendment rights of government employees. The Court's treatment of thi s
area of First Amendment law has received a fair amount of scholarly attention,
and Waters itself has been criticized for the way in which it distributes power
in the employer-employee relationship. 5 Certainly it is true that after Waters,
government employers enjoy greater freedom in terminating e mployees based
on speech. Ac ademic critiques, however, have by and large accepted the

I. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
2. See id. at 1890.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Bruce Bodner, Recent Decisions, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 461 , 483-87 ( 1995) (argu ing th at
nonhierarchical workplace structures can increase overall efficiency); Patricia C. Carnvel, Note, Waters v.
Churchill: The Denial of Public Employees' First Amendment Rights , 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 58 1, 609-11
( 1995) (same). Waters largely preserves the substantive rul e of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 ( 1983),
itself an unpopular decision with academics. For criticisms of the Connick regime, see, e.g., Ri sa L.
Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector Employment: The Deconstiuaionalization of the Public
Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv . 597 (1986); and Toni Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom
of Speech in th e Public Sec tor Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 3 (1987 ).
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Court 's concept of efficiency and its characterization of the competing interests
in Waters. 6 Such critiques are thus left to dispute the judgment of the hospital
admini strators, and they rely mostly on the contention that employee speech
can contribute to workplace efficiency. As an empirical claim about effective
management techniques, this argument can be addressed properly only to
managers ; to judges it is simply an invitation to usurp managerial discretion. 7
This Note argues that the prevailing focus on Waters's effects in the
workplace is mi sguidedly narrow and leaves the crucial issues unexamined. It
contends that at stake in Waters is not merely the relationship of the individual
employee to the government, nor the government's ability to manage the
workplace. Implicated in the Court's analysis, and affected by its ruling, are
fundamental concerns about the relationship between the citizen and the
government in general, about the scope of the democratic political process, and
ultimately about the possibility for public oversight and control of the growing
administrative state.
Proper development of these larger issues requires considerable excavation.
Part I of the Note discusses the facts of the Waters case and the resulting state
of the law. It examines the Court's reasoning to uncover the conception of
government that motivates the decision and concludes that the Court employs
a model in which governmental managers have broad discretion to limit
individual liberty in pursuit of governmental efficiency. Part II employs the
agency theory developed in corporate law to suggest that the Court's attempt
to promote efficiency by deferring to managerial judgment is theoretically
misguided. Part III broadens the analysis by questioning the Court's portrayal
of Waters as a conflict simply between individual liberty and governmental
efficiency. It suggests that the Court's libertarian understanding of the First
Amendment gives insufficient weight to the value of self-governance. Part IV
argues that self-governance is present in the Waters analysis, but hidden within
the underanalyzed notion of governmental efficiency. This Part then articulates
a more complex understanding of efficiency, which reveals that governmental
efficiency comprehends not only the narrow instrumental interest recognized
by the Court but also a broader societal interest in self-governance, both of
which are served by employee speech. Part V then proposes an alternative to
the current treatment of public employee speech that recognizes the deeper
values at issue and accords them their proper weight.

6. See sources cited sttpra note 5.
7. The question of managerial discretion is logically prior to that of efficient managem ent techniques;
if managers should have this sort of discretion, it is no argument to claim that they are making mistakes.
See Waters, ll4 S. Ct. at !887. What must be examined is the grant of discretionary power, and the above
articles fai I to come to grips with it.

;
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I. WATERS V. CHURCHILL

A. Th e Facts
The facts of Waters are disputed. Because the case reached the Court on
Waters 's motion for summary judgment, Churchill 's version is assumed to be
the correct one. She described a growing conflict with her supervisor, Cynthia
Waters , stemming from Churchill's "opposition to the hospital's improper
implementation of a nurse cross-training program." 8 Churchill felt that the
program as implemented "was detrimental to the welfare of patients in the
obstetrical ward"; 9 to her, it interfered with proper patient care and endangered
patients. She found an ally in Doctor Thomas Koch, the clinical head of
obstetrics. Dr. Koch blamed inadequate staffing in obstetrics for the birth of
a stillborn baby. Churchill further antagonized Waters by supplying Dr. Koch
with information he would otherwise not have been able to obtain about the
assignment of inexperienced nurses to the obstetrics ward, thereby assisting
him in "his campaign for improved and acceptable nursing care." 10
On January 16, 1987, during her dinner break, Churchill had a
conversation with Melanie Perkins-Graham, a cross-trainee. Churchill claimed
that the substance of the conversation, which took place in the break room,
consisted of her expressions of concern about the cross-training program and
its effect on patient care. She denied making any personal criticism of Waters.
Her version of the conversation was substantiated at trial by two witnesses
who had overheard the conversation. However, Mary Lou Ballew, another
nurse who allegedly overheard the conversation, reported to Waters that
Churchill had been criticizing the hospital administrators. Perkins-Graham, in
a subsequent meeting with Waters, confirmed Ballew's version. Based on these
reports, the hospital administrators fired Churchill.
Churchill was an at-will government employee, meaning that she could be
fired for any reason or for no reason at all. 11 Even at-will employees,
however, may not be fired for a reason that infringes upon constitutionally
protected rights. 12 The extent of public employee First Amendment rights is

8. Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7 th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1878 ( 1994).
9. /d.
10. /d. at 1117.
11. The Court's public employee speech cases tend to feature at-will employees precisely because the
First Amendment is their only protection against termination for speech. Tenured employees, by con trast,
often have contractual or statutory protections that exceed the constitutional guarantees. Their First
Amendment rights , however, are the same; thus what Waters sets out is the extent of the constitutional
protection of employee speech in general.
12. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 ( 1972) ("[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a
valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, ... [it may not do so] on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interestsespecially, his interest in freedom of speech.").

~.
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governed by a line of cases starting with Pickering v. Board of Education. 13
In Pickerin g, a schoolteacher was fired for writing a letter to the editor of a
local paper criticizing the school board's funding policies. In holding his
dismissal unconstitutional, the Court described the judicial task in such cases
as striking "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
. emp 1oyees. ,14
t h roug h 1ts
The Court revisited the Pickering bal ancing test in Connick v. Myers. 15
Connick dealt with an employee of the New Orleans District Attorney 's office
fired for distributing an office questionnaire concerning transfer policies, office
morale, the handling of grievances, employee confidence in supervisors, and
pressure to work on political campaigns. Upholding her dismissal, the Court
refined the Pickering test by making the question of whether the employee 's
speech was on a matter of public concern a threshold inquiry: No liability
could ex ist for firing an employee on the basis of speech not on a matter of
public concern. If the speech was on a matter of public concern, termination
could still be justified if the speech posed a threat of disruption. 16
The outstanding question resolved by Waters was whether the Connick
inquiry should be based upon the actual facts of the case or on what the
employer reasonably believed. 17 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of
four, noted that "employers , public and private, often do rely on hearsay, on
past similar conduct, on their personal knowledge of people's credibility, and
on other factors that the judicial process ignores." 18 Courts should not subject
an employment decision to review on the facts as determined by a judicial
proceeding : "What works best in a judicial proceeding may not be appropriate
in the employment context. " 19
The Court thus concluded that if the administrators had really believed the
account of the conversation provided by Ballew and Perkins-Graham, the firing
was justified as a matter of law because "Churchill's speech may have
substantially dampened Perkins-Graham's interest in working in obstetrics." 20
This was sufficiently disruptive to outweigh her interest in speaking even if her
speech was on a matter of public concern. 21 Since the potential for disruption

13. 39 1 U.S. 563 (1968).
14. /d. at 568.
15. 461 U.S. 13 8 ( 1983).
16. See id. at 150. The Court concluded that while one of the items on Myers's questionnaire (pres sure
to work o n political campa igns) was on a matte r of pub lic co ncern , the di srupti ve potential of the
questionnaire as a whole justifi ed her dismi ss al.
17. See Wate rs v. Ch urchi ll , 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888- 89 (1994).
18. /d. at 1888 .
19. /d.
20. /d. at 1890. The C ourt cont inued: " Discouraging people from coming to work for a department
certainly qualifi es as disruption." !d.
2 1. See id.

I
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was dispositive, the Court did not reach the question of whether Churchill's
speech (as reported to the administrators) actually was on a matter of public
concern. 22
B. The Result

Following Waters, government employers enjoy very broad discretion in
firing at-will employees for speech. Such employees may be fired for speech
not on a matter of public concern; even speech within this category justifies
termination if it poses a threat of disruption-a determination which the
employer makes and to which courts grant substantial deference. Finally, the
court's deferential analysis is to be applied not to the actual speech but to what
the employer reasonably believed was said, a procedural innovation of no
small significance.
From the perspective of traditional First Amendment theory, this legal
regime is quite odd. By the standards of ordinary First Amendment praxis, the
Waters rule is clearly unconstitutional. 23 As a content-based restriction, 24 it
is presumptively invalid 25 and would receive strict scrutiny: The government
would be required to show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 26
Under strict scrutiny, this rule would certainly fall; apprehensions of disruption
and reduced governmental efficiency cannot outweigh the fundamental rights
protected by the First Amendment. 27 The question that must be asked is why
Churchill's claim received such different treatment.
C. The Court's Reasoning
The Waters Court was certainly aware that it was not applying the
ordinary canons of First Amendment jurisprudence. It declined to do so
because the government, in firing Churchill, was acting not as sovereign but
22. See id.
23. Although Waters is a judicial decision involving the loss of a job, the resulting rule would be
analyzed under the same standards applied to a criminal statute. See id. at 1885 ("Speech can be chilled
and punished by administrative action as much as by judicial processes; in no case have we asserted or
even implied the contrary."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("It matters not
that that law has been applied in a civil action, and that it is common law only .... ").
24. A standard which permits punishment for "disruptive" speech focuses on the response to the
speech; the Court has treated such regulations as content-based because it is the expressive content of the
speech that justifies the sanction. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 ( 1963) (invalidating
law permitting conviction for speech that brought about condition of unrest).
25. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 ( 1972) (stating that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content").
26. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,270 (1981); see, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1971). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing strict scrutiny).
27. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-8.
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as employer. It is not obvious that this fact should make a difference. 28 From
the individual 's perspective , it matters very little who inflicts the punishment;
the infringement on the freedom to speak is the same. From tne perspective of
society, the difference is likewise obscure; the value of the speech suppressed
does not change. The only entity whose position or interests have changed is
the government. So we must ask, as the Waters Court did: "What is it about
the government's role as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating the
speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at
large?" 29
Waters represents the Court's first explicit statement on this question. 30
The answer it reaches is not surprising. The government's greater freedom
does not stem simply from the importance of governmental efficiency. If this
were the sole justification, the government would have no more power to
suppress employee speech than it does to silence private individuals. The
government's power to suppress speech based on its consequences is extremely
limited; the last time the Court upheld a restriction on speech because it might
persuade listeners to engage in criminal activity was in 1961. 31 Where the
speech does not expressly advocate crime (and deciding not to work in
obstetrics certainly is no crime), the Court has not upheld a restriction since
the First World War. 32 A private citizen could freely urge all government
employees not merely to avoid a particular department but to quit their jobs
entirely.
Nor can greater governmental power to suppress speech be premised on
the idea that public employees surrender some First Amendment rights by
accepting government jobs . A waiver theory would work very well to explain
the enhanced governmental power, but it has been decisively rejected by the
Court. 33 The Waters decision relied neither on the ordinary governmental
interest in efficiency nor on a waiver theory. Instead, the Court invoked the
government's heightened interest in regulating employee speech :34
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment
decisions, then , is this: The government's interest in achieving its
28. See OW EN M. FISS, LiBER ALISMDI VIDED 62 ( 1996) (s uggesting that employe r/sovereign di stincti on
provides no grounds for di sparate powers ).
29. Waters v. Churchill , 114 S. Ct. 1878 , 1886 (1 994).
30. See id.
31. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CO NSTITUTI ONA L LAW 1120 (2d ed. 199 1) (citin g Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961 )).
32. See id.
33. See Connick v. Myers, 46 1 U.S. 138, 142 ( 1983) (" [l]t has been settled th at a State cann ot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constituti onally protected interest in
freedom of expression. "); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 ( 1968) (stating that public
employ ees do not wai ve First Am endment rights).
34. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("[T]he State has interes ts as an employ er in re gul ating th e speech
of its em ployees that differ signifi cantl y from th ose it possesses in connecti on with re gul ati on of the speec h
of the ci ti ze nry in ge neral.") .
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goals as effectively and efficiently as poss ible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot
restrict the speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency.
But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose
of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be
appropriate. 35
This analysis is tantalizingly elliptical. It tells us how cases involving
employee speech are to be resolved (put a thumb on the governmental
efficiency side of the scale), but not why. More specifically, it does not explain
what it is about the employer-employee relationship that changes the ordinary
First Amendment analysis. In the sections that follow, I attempt to uncover the
model of government that funds the Court's reasoning. I first set out relevant
differences between employees and nonemployees that normatively justify a
heightened governmental interest. These differences prove too narrow to
explain the Waters rule on a descriptive level, and one of them suggests that
employee speech should receive greater protection. Having concluded that the
"heightened interest" account fails as a descriptive matter, I then provide a
picture of government that descriptively accounts for the Waters rule.

1.

The Employee Is Differently Situated When She Speaks

The most obvious difference between employees and nonemployees is that
employees occupy the governmental workplace. The result of this distinction
is that employee speech can hamper government efficiency not only as a result
of its communicative impact but also just as an activity. An employee who
chats with coworkers instead of attending to her job reduces government
efficiency just by talking, regardless of the content of her speech. The speech
not only causes disruption, it is disruption.
The government clearly has a legitimate interest in restraining the harms
threatened by this kind of speech. Speech that is disruption produces a kind of
harm that could constitutionally be prohibited were the source a
nonemployee.36 Employees should gain no greater rights to disrupt the
government by virtue of their status as employees , and restraining speech that
is disruption treats them no worse than nonemployees.
The problem with reading Waters as a response to the danger of this sort
of speech is that Waters permits dismissal not merely for speech that is
disruption but also for speech that might lead to disruption. It reaches much
more than the sort of interference that could be prohibited of private citizens ;
35. Wafers , 114 S. Ct. at 1888 .
36. For example, nonemployees may be prohibited from broadcas ti ng their political views into a
government workplace at a volume that prevents employees from working . See Ko vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S .
77, 79 (1949).
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its rule governs private nonworkplace conversations and even letters to the
editor. The question under Waters is not only whether the activity of speech
harms governmental efficiency but also whether the content of the speech
might do so. If it is the content of the speech that is at issue, then the above
difference between employee and nonemployee no longer provides a
legitimizing limiting principle. On the Waters approach, there is no obvious
reason that private citizens writing letters to the editor should be more secure
than employees gossiping instead of working.
2.

The Employee Is Differently Situated with Respect to the Effects of
Her Speech

The second significant difference between employees and nonemployees
is related to the first. An employee who writes a letter to the editor criticizing
a governmental agency on Friday afternoon will be cheek to jowl with the
objects of her vituperation come Monday. If she is a rank and file employee
who has no direct contact with those she criticizes, this may not have a
significant effect; if she is a trusted deputy, it almost certainly will.
The existence of relationships of trust and confidence that are essential to
agency functioning and that can be undermined or destroyed by employee
speech must be considered in crafting the standards of protection. Waters and
Connick both count this factor relevant, but they conceive of it more as an
aggravating factor than as a limitation. 37 That is, threats to a working
relationship enhance the already substantial deference granted to employers'
decisions; they do not delimit the legitimate reach of managerial discretion. As
was the case with speech that constitutes disruption, Waters allows termination
for speech that interferes with close working relationships, but its reach is too
broad to be justified by this admittedly relevant criterion.
3.

The Employee Is Differently Situated When She Gathers Information

The final significant difference between employees and nonemployees is
that employees are much better placed to observe the working of governmental
agencies. Since the information thus obtained is valuable (because democracy
requires an informed electorate), employee speech may be more valuable than
nonemployee speech. The Waters Court makes specific reference to this

37. See, e.g., Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890; Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 ("When close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's
judgment is appropriate."). Both Waters and Connick suggest that threats to relationships in the workplace
generally, rather than between the speaker and other workers, justify dismissal. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at
1890; Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. Because a nonemployee could similarly undermine third-party
relationships, I do not believe that this danger is an appropriate basis for dismissal.
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fact, 38 and conceivably the public concern test is an attempt to take into
account the informational asymmetry between employees and nonemployees.
If so, however, it is a strikingly infelicitous formulation .39
Waters is not clear on the question of why speech on matters of public
concern warrants more protection. It states that "a government employee, like
any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public
matters ." 40 Why the employee's interest in speaking out is greater for these
matters is somewhat mysterious; at any rate, this formulation does not reflect
any difference between employees and nonemployees. Moreover, given the
broad scope of managerial discretion authorized by Waters and the deference
granted to employers' predictions of disruption, 41 the protection afforded even
thi s category of speech is weak at best.
It is difficult to make the case that Waters responds sensitively to the
differences between employees and nonemployees. Its rule works to restrain
the dangers posed by the first two differences discussed above, but it does so
by amputation rather than surgery. Having extended the employer's discretion
beyond the limits suggested by these differences, it has gone too far to
subsequently take into account the third difference, which supports greater
protection for employee speech. The idea of a heightened governmental interest
in suppressing employee speech is normatively sound, but it does not explain
Waters on a descriptive level.
4.

Delegation and Deference

While there are real distinctions that militate in favor of increased
governmental power to regulate employee speech, they must be stretched
considerably to arrive at the Waters rule. On a natural understanding of these
differences, the government's interest in efficiency is adequately protected
simply by allowing the employer to fire an employee who is doing a bad job:
If the activity of speech is disruptive, or if the employee's speech reduces her
efficiency, the broad scope of the Waters rule is not required to justify
termination. The true effect of Waters is simply to grant the government
employer great power to regulate speech in the name of its interest "' in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. "' 42 The only principle that produces thi s result is the principle
that governmental employers must have considerab le discretion to pursue
38. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887 ("Government employees are often in the best position to know
what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed
opinions .... ") (c itation omitted).
39. For a detailed analysis of the defects of the public conce rn test, see infra Section Y.A.
40. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887.
41. See id.
42. /d. at 1884 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (q uotin g Pickering v. Board of Educ ., 391 U.S. 563 ,
568 ( 1968))) (internal quotations omitted).
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efficiency as they see best; thus the government as employer is not subject to
the ordinary constitutional limitations.
What distinguishes the government as employer from the government as
sovereign? The obvious answer is that the government as employer pursues
specific tasks and has limited powers with which to accomplish them. The
Waters Court adumbrates this conception with its reference to "[g]overnmental
agencies ... charged by law with doing particular tasks." 43 This distinction
between sovereign and employer suggests why traditional First Amendment
rationales for protecting speech might not apply. Because governmental
agencies are charged by law with specific tasks and overseen by the popularly
elected government, the danger of overreaching should be less. Thus the role
of speech in allowing citizens to prevent government abuse of power-the
checking value 44-is less important. Additionally, the delegation of tasks to
experts reduces the role of the individual citizen in decisionmaking . Thus the
self-government rationale for free speech-that it facilitates democratic
deliberation 45-is inapplicable.
Hence we can understand Waters as following from the principle that
where governmental power is limited to the pursuit of specific institutional
goals , the checks on that power may be limited as well. This is a somewhat
counterintuitive principle, but it accords well with the Court's general approach
of allowing the government greater latitude when it acts in a role other than
that of sovereign. 46 For example, the Postal Service's interest in
accomplishing "the most efficient and effective postal delivery system" 47 has
been held to support a prohibition against solicitation on postal premises. 48
The Court noted that "Congress has made it clear that 'it wished the Postal
Service to be run more like a business, "'49 and that "it is a long-settled
principle that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny" when the government is acting not as lawmaker but as
proprietor. 50 The most charitable way to read Waters, then, is as a product of
the delegation of power that characterizes the modern administrative state.
When a governmental agency is acting "like a business," it may take actions

43. !d. at 1887.
44. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 538- 39 (locating necessity of checking value in "[t]he government's monopoly of legitimized
violence").
45. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
24-27 ( 1948).
46. It is also roughly the explanation arrived at by at least one noted First Amendment scholar. See
ROBERT C. POST, CO NSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY , COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 240 (1995)
(differentiating First Amendment rul es applicable to government in managerial capacity from those
applicable in governance).
47. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990).
48. See id. at 732-33.
49. /d. at 732 (citation omitted).
50. /d. at 725.

.r.Ii
t~.
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appropriate for an analogous business 51 without facing the ordinary level of
First Amendment scrutiny. 52
The vision of government that provides the best descriptive account of
Waters is one in which governmental tasks are delegated to experts who then
enjoy broad discretion within their spheres of authority. Government
employees have very limited speech rights against their employers because
government functions better if the experts are allowed to manage the
workplace without interference: The government acting as manager may
restrain individual liberty in the name of efficiency. I will refer to this model
of the workings of government as the model of delegation and deference.
There are a number of things that can be said about this conception of
government. Its vision of disinterested enlightened experts efficiently
performing their delegated duties may well be untrue to the facts of the world.
Others have made criticisms on these grounds. 53 The next Part argues instead
that the insights of agency theory suggest that it is theoretically misguided.

II. APPLYING AGENCY THEORY TO GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY
The Waters analysis focuses on the efficiency of a particular government
agency in performing a particular task. 54 I will refer to this narrow conception
as "task efficiency." 55 The question is whether the rule of Waters promotes
task efficiency. Academic commentary is replete with arguments that, as an
empirical matter, task efficiency is increased by employee speech. 56 As noted
above, 57 these arguments are unsatisfying because if the grant of managerial
discretion to employers is legitimate, their decisions to restrict speech are
legitimate likewise, even if mistaken. This Part employs the agency theory
developed in the corporate context to analyze the initial grant of discretion and
asks whether this allocation of power is likely to promote efficiency. 58

51. There are still some restrictions on governmental action that similarly situated private businesses
would not face. For example, the government may not require low-level employees to support a particular
political party. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
52. Even this principle does not justify Waters entirely, as Waters applies not only to employees of
government agencies, but also to employees of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches.
53 . See sources cited supra note 5.
54. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887- 88 (1994).
55. The neologism is not pleonastic. Part IV argues that the Court's conception of efficiency is
fundamentally flawed. This Part seeks only to point out a mistake internal to the Waters analysis. It accepts
the Court's characterization of efficiency and claims that even on this understanding, the argument for
managerial discretion fails.
56. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 5; Bodner, supra note 5; Camvel, supra note 5.
57. See supra note 7.
58. Analogizing public agencies to corporations may seem odd at first. The analogy is quite strong,
however. Public money (i.e., tax dollars) supports these agencies, and their managers have a duty to serve
the public interest. Public agencies produce services, rather than profits, but surely these services (police
protection and medical treatment, for example) are more important than stock dividends. Granting these
basic facts, what seems odd is that the federal government, which is sufficiently concerned about corporate
agency costs to mandate corporate disclosure, shows less regard for agency costs in the public sector. For
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The first step in this analysis is the recognition that talk of a
"governmental interest in efficiency" is misleading . The government exists
only to serve and protect its citizens. Put in more theoretical terms, the
government-public relationship is an agency relationship-a relationship "under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent)
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decisionmaking authority to the agent." 59 The government, as an agent, has
no cognizable interests at all; any governmental interest must derive from the
interest of the principal: the people. 60 The people, of course, do have a
significant interest in governmental task efficiency: They want it to provide the
services that it does as cheaply as possible. Governmental task efficiency may
thus be described as provision of services at least cost.
How can governmental task efficiency best be achieved? The problem is
that " [i]f both parties to the [agency] relationship are utility maximizers there
is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests
of the principal." 61 Government employers may be more concerned with
increasing their power or perquisites, or protecting their jobs, than with
efficiently pursuing the public will. How can the people ensure that they are
getting the best deal possible?
The problem of agency costs has received a good deal of attention in the
context of corporate law. 62 A corporation that minimizes agency costs (i.e.,
one that is more efficient) will be more attractive to investors . In a market
where corporations compete for investors' dollars, this means that efficient
corporations will survive and inefficient ones will not. Corporate law, and
corporate behavior, are thus geared in large part towards the reduction of
agency costs.
What is the corporate policy on employee speech? The first principle of
corporate law is the separation of ownership and control. The shareholders own
the corporation, but they do not run it. This task is delegated to expert
managers who enjoy discretion in the context of ordinary business.
Management discretion is assured by the business judgment rule, which
provides, roughly, that courts will not second-guess the decisions of managers
who are informed, disinterested, and not under the influence of third parties .63
Demonstrating that a particular decision was mistaken will not sustain a
a historical development of the corporate analogy, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignry and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432-36 (1987).
59. Michae l C. Jensen & William H. Meckling , Theory of the Firm: Manag eria l Belwviot; Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 ( 1976). For further developments of this seminal
account, see, e.g., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) .
60. Cf New York Times Co. v. Sulli van, 376 U.S. 254, 274 ( 1964) (s tating that people, not
government, possess absolute sovereignty).
61. Jen sen & Meckling, supra note 59, at 308.
62. See sources cited supra note 59.
63. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 123 ( 1986).
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sharehold er suit. 64 This discretion exten ds to hirin g and firing decisions , so
an employee who criticizes management run s a su bstantial ri sk of being fired
and having no recourse. If corporations, which must be efficient to survive,
allow managers this much discretion in firing employees for the ir speech, then
must efficiency not be increased by such a rule?
The Waters Court appeared to think so. The rule of Waters grants
managers of governmental organizations a latitude strikingly simi lar to that of
the business judgment rule. If a reasonably informed manager holds a
reasonable belief that an employee's speech is potentially disruptive, th e
employee has no redress, even if subsequent in ves tigation reveal s that the
speech ac tu ally did merit protection. 65
The Waters Court did not explicitly state that it was reasonin g by analogy
to the corporate context. However, Justice O'Connor's remarks in Kokinda
about Congress's desire to see the Postal Service "run more like a business" 66
strongly suggest that thi s is the paradigm the Court has in mind. The appeal
to corporate practice seems, at any rate, the best argument that can be
mustered .67 But the analogy is imperfect at best. As the following section s
discuss, the corporate world employs a broad range of techniques to reduce
agency costs. Because these devices are absent from public agencies , the
importance of employee speech is magnified.

A. Corporate Devices for Promoting Task Efficiency
From the perspective of task efficiency, the potential benefit of free and
uninhibited speech by corporate employees is obvious . Employees are often the
best positioned to see inefficiencies and abuses in corporate management ; at
a minimum, they are far better off than the shareholders, who are often entirely
ignorant of all but the broadest outlines of corporate policy. 68 Employee
speech can thus play an important role in informing shareholders and allowing
them to monitor management. Why, then, have corporations not adopted rules
protecting employee speech?
The answer is that in the corporate context, a number of other devices
exist that are designed to allow shareholders to monitor and control managers.
Much of the information that employees could provide to th e public is the

64. See, e. g., Kamin v. America n Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 8 11 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (dismissing su it
alleging managerial mistake for failure to state claim).
65. See supra Section I. B.
66. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 ( 1990) (citation om itted)
67. Robert Post has developed a lucid , coherent, and intriguing theory of governmen t au thority in the
managerial domain. His constitutional ration ale, however, seems to be the claim that in strumen tal standards
are appropriate for hierarchi cal organizations pursuing institutional goals. See POST, sup ra note 46, at
234-39. From a normative constitutional perspec tive, this argum en t rather begs the ques tion .
68. For example, coworkers are well placed to observe whether the CEO leaves at 4:30 p.m. every
day, and the pilot of the corporate jet knows whether it is often take n to Aru ba.
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subject of federal mandatory disclosure requirements. Federal securities laws
require that publicly traded companies make broad and continuous disclosure
to shareholders, informing them of how the business is performing and what
management's plans are. 69 They must report management compensation, and
compare it to the compensation of managers of comparable firms. The market
also plays a role in informing shareholders; stock prices (in theory) reflect all
material public information relating to the company.70
Shareholders can control managers in that their votes are required to ratify
major corporate decisions; 71 they also vote for candidates to the board of
directors. 72 Executive compensation may be tied to corporate performance
(and hence to shareholder interests) by grants of stock or options in place of
salary. 73 A mismanaged corporation may be the target of a takeover bid by
outsiders who believe that they can run the corporation more efficiently. 74
Finally, shareholders dissatisfied with the performance of management may
dissociate themselves from the venture by selling their shares in the liquid
market. 75 This exit power is remarkably effective because it uses the market
to monitor management. Inefficiencies that may be hidden from the most
diligent shareholders will show up on the bottom line, and shareholders will
transfer their investment dollars to companies offering better returns . The
importance of exit rights is suggested by the fact that in close corporations,
where the shareholder has no ability to exit, courts have held controlling
shareholders to a higher duty of loyalty. 76
B . Task Efficiency in Public Organizations
In the corporate context, the agency costs created by the delegation of
decisionmaking power are controlled by structural features of the
principal-agent relationship
(e.g.,
shareholder voting rights
and
performance-linked executive compensation), federally mandated disclosure,
and exit powers that produce a continual competition for investment dollars .
The control of agency costs in the citizen-government relationship displays
some similar features. Voters can control the constitution of the popularly
elected government. The Freedom of Information Act 77 facilitates the

69. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a (1996).
70. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 368-69 (3d ed. 1988) (describing strong
and semistrong forms of market efficiency).
71. See CLARK, supra note 63, § 3.1, at 94.
72. See id.
73. See id. § 6.2.1, at 202-09.
74. See id. § 13.2, at 533-35.
75. See id. § 1.2, at 14.
76. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (imposing partnership·
type fiduciary duty).
77. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1994).
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dissemination of information. Rival political parties stand ready as competing
alternatives to the existing government. The federal judiciary jealously guards
the First Amendment rights of citizens to comment on and criticize the
workings of government. 78
However, some of the devices that reduce agency costs in the corporate
context are unavailable to increase governmental task efficiency. The public
does not receive the information impounded in stock prices, which reflect the
opinion of sophisticated professionals as to the organization's overall
performance, nor is official compensation linked to performance. Finally,
citizens lack the shareholder's simplest response to dissatisfaction with
management: exit via the sale of shares in a liquid market. 79
Public control of governmental agencies suffers from the above handicaps
and additional difficulties as well. The public does not exert direct electoral
control over administrators, nor is electoral ratification required for policy
changes. 80 The people receive no annual statements from their hospitals and
police forces. The press, which is perhaps the most effective monitor of
government, relies significantly on third parties to call matters to its attention.
Freedom of Information Act requests can force disclosure, but the sheer
volume of information available upon demand makes effective monitoring very
difficult if one does not know where to look. It seems likely that employee
speech can significantly enhance monitoring.
The facts of Waters lend credence to this supposition. According to
Churchill's account, she was performing precisely this monitoring function:
providing the director of obstetrics with "information that he would otherwise
not have had." 81 The policy about which Churchill was providing information
had, according to the director of obstetrics, already caused harm to the
public; 82 certainly its existence was relevant to the hospital's task efficiency.
Without Churchill's speech, the information would not be available to the
director (who could oppose the cross-training) or the public (who could lobby
elected representatives for change). Yet while the Court vigorously protects the
speech of the citizen criticizing the government, it offers no such protection for

78. This constitutional commitment to, and judicial solicitude of, speech to inform the public provides
a prima facie reason to suppose that similar concerns exist in the agency context and require simi Jar
protection.
79. The social contract theory of John Locke has sometimes been thought to suggest that individual
consent comes from the refusal to exercise an exit power that citizens do possess: the ability to leave the
country. The concept of exit as exile has been rightly characterized as an "epistemologically stupid and
politically heartless answer" to the problem of consent. STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 25
(1979). The point of the shareholders' exit rights, after all, is that they are costless to exercise.
80. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131 (1980) ("(Administrators] are neither
elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are.").
81. Churchi II v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1878 ( 1994 ).
82. Dr. Koch blamed inadequate staffing for the birth of a stillborn baby; the baby was revi ved but
suffered brain damage as a result. See id.
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government employees, speakers who are uniquely well placed to inform the
public about the functioning of governmental agencies. 83

C. Waters and Task Efficiency
The foregoing analysis should suggest at a minimum that the relation of
employee speech to governmental task efficiency is not as obvious as the
model of delegation and deference suggests. In fact, the Waters decision and
the public concern test ignore the significant task efficiency benefits that
employee speech can bring. Speech on matters of public concern aids
democratic control of government as a whole. It promotes (we hope) informed
debate; it ensures that the market of ideas is fully stocked. But this macro-level
democratic process is not the concern of the Waters Court. Instead, the
efficiency it seeks to protect is the task efficiency of the micro level-the task
efficiency of an individual governmental agency. The speech that promotes
efficiency at this level is speech about the operation of the agency itself, and
this type of speech falls outside the scope of matters of public concern, at least
as the category is construed in Connick. 84 Waters thus gives no protection to
precisely the speech that would promote task efficiency by allowing the public
to monitor the behavior of governmental agencies.
It may well be true, of course, that greater protection of speech imposes
its own costs . But this fact by itself does not suggest that protecting employee
speech is a mistake; after all, the problem of agency costs would not exist if

83. The Court does, of course, extend ordinary First Amendment protections to at-will employees.
They can no more be fined or imprisoned for speec h than can the general public. This protection is
somewha t illusory, howe ver, given the ready availability of termination as a sa nction. See Pickering v.
Board of Edu c., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ("[T]he threat of dismissal from public employment is .. . a
potent means of inhibiting speech.").
84. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 14 8-49 ( 1983). The precise scope of "public concern" remains
somewhat mysterious. See Waters v. Churchill , 114 S. Ct. 1878 , 1896-97 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(contrasting O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 9 15 ( I st Cir. 1993) (using content-based test) , wi th Gillum
v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117 , 120-21 (5th Cir. 1994) (using contex t-based test)) . Compare Murray v.
Gardner, 74 1 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (" If Connick's rule could be bypassed by the argum en ts that
Murray rai ses-that public monies and government efficien cy are involved-Connick would stand for
nothing.") , with Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 (I Oth Cir. 1989) (stating that public concern
includes speech "calculated to disclose wron gdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance") (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). See gen erally Stephen Allred, From Connick ro Confusion: The Srruggle to Define
Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 I ND. L.J. 43, 49-74 (1988) (analyzing public concern cases);
Massaro, supra note 5, at 25 (stat ing that doctrin e " is vague [and] internally incon sistent").
What can be said is that the public concern test is the product of a self-governance-based criterion
working on a general level. Despite Connick' s expansive language, see 461 U.S. at 146 ("political , soc ial,
or other concern"), the Connick Court use s "political" and "publi c" almos t interchangeably, see id. at 145,
and it interpre ts prior employee speec h cases largely wi th a focus on the connection of the speech to the
political process, see id. at 146. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Marrers of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Caregory, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 31 -3 7 ( 1990) (analyzing
doctrine). The claim of thi s Note is that empl oyee speec h makes its unique contribution to self-government
not when it deals with the political process-which is the focus of the self-government rationale-but when
it discloses information about the inner working of agencies. In the administrative state, of course, most
matters of internal governmental functioning are far re moved from direct electoral control.
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there were costless monitori ng devices. The extensive disclosure required of
corporations is quite expensive; nevertheless, the government thinks monitoring
important enough to mandate disclosure rather than leav ing it up to the market
or managerial judgment. Waters embodies an opposite approach. With no
market control and no disclosure requirements, it grants employers great
latitude in determining how much speech they are willing to tolerate.
This sort of deference goes well beyond granting experts discretion in the
pursuit of specific substantive goals; it allows them to control the formal
environment in which they operate. This presents a clear conflict of interest
because agents who choose less monitoring are more able to deviate from the
principal's interest in pursuit of private gain. They thus have an incentive to
choose an inefficiently small amount. 85 Herein lies the Court's mistake.
Balancing the costs and benefits of employee speech is difficult, and the rule
that best serves task efficiency may be hard to ascertain. What is clear,
however, is that workplace superiors should not be the decisionmakers .
Regardless of what we believe about efficient managerial techniques, the grant
of discretion to regulate speech is ill-conceived.

Ill. BENEATH THE SURFACE: LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN

WATERS

The preceding Part argued that the Court's assimilation of the
governmental agency to the private corporation does not produce the result it
supposes. If public agencies had to compete on the basis of their task
efficiency, the market might well choose those that protected employee speech
as a device for minimizi ng agency costs. Managers, at any rate, are likely to
permit a suboptimal level of speech because of their inherent conflict of
interest. From a utilitarian perspective, the Court's efficiency concerns are
overstated; from a theoretical perspective, its grant of discretion to managers
is misguided.
However, the argument as phrased is not yet a constitutional argument. It
leaves undisturbed the Court's major premise: that in the hierarchy of values,
individual liberty must give way to governmental efficiency in the managerial
domain. The previous Part suggests that protecting employee speech may
increase task efficiency and that there may be good pragmatic reasons not to
allow managers to decide how much protection such speech should receive. All
the same, this seems a case for legislative rather than judicial intervention .
Task efficiency is a utilitarian aspiration, not a constitutional value, and courts
are not the appropriate pl ace to hash out the details of how best to promote it.

85. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 ( 1980) (Brennan, J., dissen tin g) ("Parti ality must
be expected when govern ment auth oriti es ce nsor the views of subordinates, especially if those views are
critica l of the censors .").
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Yield on the principle and you are only arguing over price. This Part will
challenge the Court's major premise, not by claiming that liberty outweighs
efficiency, but by suggesting that more is at stake than individual liberty. It
will argue that the First Amendment aims to protect not merely individual
liberty but also self-governance, that government employee speech directly
serves the societal interest in self-governance, and that the Waters analysis is,
consequently, incomplete . The model of delegation and deference is not only
theoretically unwise; it is constitutionally unsound.
A. Two Theories of th e First Amendment

Weighed against the government employer's interest in efficiency in the
Court 's test is "the employee's interest in expressing herself on [a matter of
public concern]." 86 The Court conceives of Waters as presenting a conflict
between individual liberty and government efficiency. While government
efficiency cannot ordinarily trump the First Amendment's guarantee of liberty,
different rules apply within the managerial domain. 87
If we accept the Court's analysis on its own terms, the result is hard to
challenge. The government must be able to manage the workplace, and
application of ordinary standards of First Amendment review would prevent
this: It would, for example, prohibit the discharge of a speechwriter who
articulated her own beliefs rather than her employer's position. 88 Importing
the First Amendment wholesale into the government workplace cannot be
right; individual liberty must give way to managerial authority.
This reasoning is seductively straightforward. However, by casting the
First Amendment interest at stake in terms of individual liberty, it presents
only half of the picture. Freedom has two faces: the negative freedom
(independence or liberty) to conduct one's life without government
interference, and the positive freedom (self-governance) to follow self-made
laws. 89 Traditional First Amendment theory, holding a mirror up to Janus ,
presents two different rationales for protecting speech. On the liberty model,
free expression must be protected as a means to self-actualization. 90 A selfgovernance-oriented91 theory, by contrast, locates the importance of free

86. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1884.
87. See POST, supra note 46, at 235.
88. See id.
89. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LiBERTY 122-34 ( 1969).
90. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Th eory of the
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62-63 ( 1974).
91. My use of "liberty" and "self-governance" to characterize competing poles of First Amendmen t
theory does not reflect a general usage; Owen Fiss, for example, employs "autonomy" where I use
"liberty." See FISS, supra note 28, at 17. The difference is also expressed in terms of speaker- and
hearer-centered orientations.
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speech in the information it provides to others. 92
From this basic difference in values flow several others . The liberty-based
account takes speech as fundamentally an individual right, a means of
promoting individual self-expression and self-fulfillment. Its paradigm of
valuable speech is an expression of the conscientious beliefs and commitments
of the individual, those attitudes most directly related to selfhood. The content
of this category will differ from person to person, but it will include a broad
range of literary, artistic, philosophical, and religious expression . The liberty
model thus suggests that protection for speech should be quite extensive.
Courts have extended the protections of the First Amendment to a broad
range of expression, and the liberty-oriented model explains this judicial
practice well. 93 However, it does not so easily explain why the First
Amendment's protection is so strong. Self-actualization is an important value ,
but there is no obvious reason to place it at the heart of constitutional
rights. 94 Restrictions on speech affront only the individuals restricted, and it
is not clear why their interest in self-expression is much greater than their
interest in, for example, economic liberty.
The self-governance model has an answer to the question of why free
speech is so important: It allows citizens to receive the information essential
to self-government. Speech rights are for the benefit of society more than the
individual; restrictions on speech harm everyone deprived of the information
the speech would convey. The self-governance model focuses on speech that
increases the amount of relevant information available. It places special
emphasis on speech about public policy, speech that conveys information
essential to self-governance. Without self-governance, other liberties are
meaningless; from this perspective, freedom of speech appears as "the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other freedom." 95
The self-governance model does a good job of explaining why First
Amendment protection is so strong. However, its explanation is incomplete;
a self-governance rationale offers no clear reason to protect literary or artistic
speech, which make no obvious contributions to self-government, 96 and no

92. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 24-27 (arguing that free speech is essential because of role
in self-government); Blasi, supra note 44, at 527 (maintaining that free speech allows citizens to prevent
government abuse of power). The following discussion focuses primarily on the self-government rationale.
93 . See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 ( 1977) (stating that "our cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take
a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First Amendment protection").
94. See Robert H. Bork, Newral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 25
( 1971) ("The principled judge ... cannot, on neutral grounds, choose to protect speech [as a means of
self-expression] more than he protects any other claimed freedom.").
95. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 ( 1937); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
( 1980) (characterizing speech about public affairs as resting on "highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 ( 1964) (noting that "speech concerning
public affairs is ... the essence of self-government").
96. See Bork, supra note 94, at 26-28 (discussing narrow applicability of self-governance rationale).
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reason to protect parti cular speakers.97 Where liberty expl ained breadth but
not strength, sel f-governance does the reverse. Because courts extend
protection that is both broad and strong, most scholars recognize that neither
theory, in its pure form, provides an adequate descriptive account of the role
of the First Ame ndment in constitutional theory. Both values mu st be
considered. 98
B. Liberty and Self-Governance in Waters
The existence of two distinct rationales for First Amendment protection
poses two theoretic al questions for courts. The first is how the two values
interact, or what effect should be given the doubled claim to protection. On
this issue, public employee speech cases are an odd anomaly in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Usually, the two theories reinforce each other:
Protection appropri ate to the strength of the self-governance interest is
extended as broadly as the liberty interest requires. In the Waters balancing
test, by contrast, the two theories undercut each other.
The Court describes the First Amendment interest at stake as the
individual 's interest in free expression-an obvious nod to the liberty model.
However, having set out a liberty-based rationale for protecting speech, the
Court then restricts the range of that protection by the self-governance-oriented
criterion that the speech be on a matter of "public concern ." This takes the
weaker interest-that of the individual in self-expression rather than that of the
public in self-governance-and applies it to the narrower category: speech
essential to self-governance, rather than speech essential to self-expression. In
the language of set theory, the Court restricts First Amendment protection to
the intersection, rather than the union, of the liberty and self-governance
universes; it then weighs that speech according to only the liberty model. This
peculiar conflation of rationales stands First Amendment theory on its head:
The usual procedure provides protection that is broad and strong rather than
narrow and weak.99
The second question for courts is what the relation between the two values
is: Are they best understood as conceptually linked, distinct, or competing? On
this question, Waters runs true to form. The Court sees a strong conceptual
linkage between liberty and self-governance; in particular, it sees the protection
of liberty as the only legitimate way to promote self-governance. Even when
self-consciously promoting free speech in the name of self-governance, the
Court does so using a liberty-based conception: Because free speech is
97 . If two speak e rs inte nd to con vey the same inform ati on, silencin g one is no harm from th e
perspecti ve o f se lf-governm e nt. (This stateme nt, though correc t in essence, is some what ove rbroad; for
exampl e, the identities or number of speake rs may be part of the information the speakers conv ey.)
98 . See TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-1 , at 789 .
99. See supra note 93.

1997]

Costs of Agencies

1253

essential to self-governance, the go vernment may not infringe on the rights of
speakers. 100 The result is the libertarian focus reflected m Waters 's
invocation of the individual's interest in expression.
Where the Court adheres to the linkage model and the consequent
libertarian jurisprudence, contemporary First Amendment theory increasingly
sees liberty and self-governance as competing. Modern legal realists and others
claim that the formal neutrality of treatment dictated by a liberty model merely
accomplishes the translation of existing inequalities of wealth and power into
speech. 101 Self-governance requires a rich and balanced public debate, and
in an expressive environment dominated by moneyed interests, this ideal
discourse can be produced only by governmental redistribution of speech
rights. 102 The difficulty with this approach is that it runs directly against the
traditional libertarian understanding; in trying to provide a rich and balanced
public debate, the government must favor underrepresented views and
unavoidably infringes on the liberty of some individu al speakers. 103 As Owen
Fiss puts it, "the First Amendment appears on both sides of the equation. " 104
What is especially interesting about Waters is that it presents a situation
in which liberty and self-governance are on the same side, but liberty by itself
is insufficient to carry the day. The individual's interest in speaking cannot, as
Justice O'Connor concludes, outweigh the government's need for managerial
authority. 105 However, employees are a uniquely valuable source of
information about the workings of public agencies, and a societal interest in
self-governance does outweigh governmental efficiency. 106 The dilemma
posed by Waters cannot be resolved within an analytical framework that sees
a necessary connection between liberty and self-governance. Within thi s
framework, the two values must rise or fall together, and the inevitable result
is overprotection of liberty or underprotection of self-governance.

100. See. e.g., First Nat' I Bank of Bos ton v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 ( 1978) (overturning restriction s on
political adve rtising by corporati ons); Buckl ey v. Vale o, 424 U.S. I (1 976) (ove rturning restricti ons on
campaign spending).
I 0 I. See J.M. Balkin , Some Realism Aboul Pluralism: Legal Rea/is! Approaches to !he Firs!
Amendm enl, 1990 DUKE L.J . 375, 395- 97. The relaied importanl insight is that the government, by
enfo rcin g propert y and contract ri ghts, produces the existing state of affairs.
102. See FISS, supra note 28 pass im ; Balkin, supra not e 101 , at 410-14. The leg al realist argument .
of whi ch Balkin is probably the most se nsiti ve and insightful expos ito r, sugges ts that the current debate
over free dom of speech merely repeat s the Lochner-era debate over freedom of contract; that just as
fre edom of contract can be enhanced by more equal distribution of bargaining power, freedom of speech
can be enhanced by more equal di stributi on of speech rights. See also David Yassky, Eras of the First
Amendm ent , 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1699, 1749-5 3 (1991).
103 . Consider, for example, the limitation on private campaign expenditures rejected by the Court in
Bu ckley. The Court stated: "[T]he concept th at gove rnment may res tri ct the speec h of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relati ve voice of others is wholl y foreign to the First Amendment .
"
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
104. FISS, supra note 28, at 24.
105. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1890 ( 1994).
l 06. More precisely, I will argue, gove rnm ental efficienc y inc ludes se lf-govern ance . See inf ra Part IV.
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One way to look at employee speech cases, then, is as a rare opportunity
to approach the acceptance of a self-governance theory by recognizing selfgovernance as a distinct (though not yet competing) interest, one whose
demands must be heeded even when liberty speaks in vain. 107 This unique
constellation of constitutional values could herald the conception of a new
judicial philosophy; from the fact that self-governance may prevail where
liberty does not, one might conclude that self-governance likewise prevails in
a conflict with liberty. 108
A wholesale embrace of the legal realist critique would lead courts to
permit legislative infringements on individual speech rights in the name of selfgovernance, just as the post-Lochner Court allowed infringement on freedom
of contract in order to equalize bargaining power. 109 One need not, however,
go all the way to the competition model in order to question Waters; the
essential step is simply to recognize self-governance as a distinct value. The
following Part attempts an analysis that disentangles the liberty and selfgovernance interests at stake in Waters. It applies the theory of agency costs
to demonstrate that efficiency need not be considered a monolithic value; it can
be broken down in a way that shows it contains the self-governance interest.
This deeper analysis suggests that from a constitutional perspective, the Court's
approach is seriously flawed.

IV.

RETHINKING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY

I have suggested that what is at issue in Waters is not so much the
government's ability to manage the workplace as the public's ability to manage
government, that Waters presents us with a challenge not only to individual
liberty but also to self-governance. Self-governance may require different
107. Arguably, in crafting the public concern test, the Connick Court took a tentative step toward
recognizing liberty and self-governance as distinct interests and suggested that self-governance carries more
weight. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145--46 (1983). I do not, however, think that the public
concern test is a good way to take this step; in fact, I will argue that it has fatal flaws. See infra Part V.
108. This conclusion follows from a naive faith in transitivity of constitutional values. However,
serious difficulties accompany the suggestion that speech, like economic power, can be parcelled out by
the legislature to serve utilitarian ends. Most notably, speech rights are often construed as serving to protect
the political process, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 80, at 93-94, and it is obviously problematic to allow a
majoritarian legislature control of process-reinforcing values. One explanation of the apparent paradox in
asserting both that self-governance is more important than liberty and that liberty defeats self-governance
is an understandable judicial reluctance to allow legislatures to decide whose speech needs to be suppressed
to promote public debate . This Note does not advocate a self-governance-centered reconception of the First
Amendment; its claim is only that self-governance is an interest distinct from liberty, and that disentangling
the dual interests at stake in Waters will lead to a different analysis of employee speech. Whether a
coherent jurisprudence could be fashioned that does allow self-governance to prevail over liberty is a
question that is difficult, fascinating, and outside the scope of this Note.
I 09. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ( 1937). Whether legal scholarship can prompt such
a reconception of the First Amendment remains to be seen; what the product might be is impossible to
predict. The Supreme Court shows no present inclination to midwife the second coming of West Coast
Hotel, see supm text accompanying note I 00, but as the academics press their suit, the First Amendment
as self-governance slouches towards Washington to be born.
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treatment than liberty. As discussed above, howeve r, the Cou rt is reluctant to
conceive of self-governance as a di stinct value, and the dem ands of managerial
discretion make it impractical to promote self-governance by protecting liberty.
How, then, is self-governance to be served? This Part argues that the Court's
primary value, governmental efficiency, bears within it the seeds of a selfgovernance-based conception.

A. Task Efficiency and Democratic Efficiency
A striking feature of the Waters analysis is that the notion of efficiency is
taken as a primitive concept: one which cannot be broken down into further
components. Part II adopted the Court's understanding of efficiency as simply
task efficiency. This Section claims to the contrary that task efficiency is not
the whole story, nor even the most important chapter.
Governmental efficiency may be defined as the course of action optimal
from the perspective of the people. 110 This course of action must have two
characteristics. It must pursue the goals the people want, using (to the extent
that they care) the techniques they want, and it must use these techniques in
the best manner. More simply, government must do the right thing, and it must
do it as well as possible. This latter concern, which I have considered under
the name of task efficiency, implicates fairly narrow questions of managerial
competence. The former, which I will call "democratic efficiency," raises
larger questions of accountability and responsiveness to the public will.
Distinguishing between the two is important because task efficiency an d
democratic efficiency are not values of the same order. Task efficiency is
utilitarian in nature and may be balanced with other costs and benefits.
Democratic efficiency-and the protection of speech that promotes it-is
demanded by the Constitution. 111 The two components are incommensurable;
they cannot be traded off one against the other. Having taken efficiency apart,
we cannot put it back together.
B. Self-Governance and Democratic Efficiency

The previous Part has discussed the idea that the First Amendment is
intended to facilitate self-governance. The evil to be prevented , on thi s view,
is government suppression of information essential to democratic deliberation:
The people cannot control the government if they do not know what it is
doing. In its extreme version, this could amount to covert government
violations of civil rights or domination of gove rnment by hidden interest
110. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 59, at 327.
Ill. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 ( 1931) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to th e end that government may be re spo nsive to the will of the
people ... is a fundamental principle of our consti tut iona l system.").
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groups. Moderated, the issue is simply the inability of the public to monitor
the performance of its representatives, to figure out who is doing what it wants
and who should be turned out of office. Once we turn away from nightmare
fantasies of secret police and sinister cabals, the problem of self-government
appears as the problem of agency costs writ large.
The focus is somewhat different, however. From the perspective of selfgovernment, it is not task efficiency but democratic efficiency that is crucial.
Because employee speech facilitates monitoring, it promotes . both task
efficiency and democratic efficiency, but only the latter is a value of
constitutional significance. By focusing solely on task efficiency, the Waters
Court ignored the more important function of employee speech. I have argued
already that the relationship of managerial discretion to task efficiency is not
as clear as the Court supposes; agency theory suggests that task efficiency is
promoted by restricting discretion in some ways, and discretion to control
speech is one. Yet even if the Court were right about task efficiency, and even
if employee speech reduced task efficiency by more than it increased
democratic efficiency, the Waters rule would still be a mistake. The
government is not a corporation, the Constitution is not a text of law and
economics, and all costs are not the same.
In terms of agency theory, the point can be put simply. There are three
kinds of agency costs: 112 monitoring expenditures by the principal, 113
bonding expenditures by the agent, 114 and residual loss. 115 In the corporate
context, these costs are all of the same order. Shareholders, with some few
notable exceptions, 116 want the corporations they own to maximize value;
they do not care very much about what the corporate policies are. Within the
corporate world, democratic efficiency is a subordinate value.
Herein lies the true difference between boardroom and bureaucracy. In the
context of democratic society, residual losses, which represent government
divergence from the public will, are of another class entirely. Just as speech
that threatens disruption in general presents us with the choice between the
dangers of expression and suppression, the speech rights of the public
employee present us with a choice between the risk of the government's doing

112. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 59, at 308.
113. The loss of governmental task efficiency caused by protecting potentially disruptive speech should
be considered the "cost" of the monitoring it provides. See iJ.
114. Bonding costs are resources expended by the agent to guarantee the principal that he will not take
certain actions, or that the principal will be compensated if he does. Bonding costs are not crucial to this
analysis, but insofar as protecting employee speech enhances monitoring, it reduces bonding costs by
making them less necessary. See iJ.
115. Residual loss is the reduction in welfare suffered by the principal due to the agent's divergence
from the optimal course of action. See iJ.
116. Shareholders have tried, with mixed results, to influence corporate policy by including a proposal
with management's proxy materials pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 ( 1996); see
also Roosevelt v. E.!. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing Du Pont
to omit proposal to accelerate phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons).
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the wrong thing aud the risk of doing the right thing less well. Just as the First
Amendment makes the first choice for us, 117 so too it makes the second , on
the basis of democratic principle rather than utilitarian calculus. 11 8
The First Amendment directs us to overinvest in monitoring; democratic
efficiency (compliance with the public will) trumps task efficiency (c heap
performance). Even if employee speech reduces task efficiency, democratic
efficiency
reqmres
its
protection. 119 An
examination
of the
democracy-rei nforcing character of employee speech will flesh out this
theoretical argument.

C. Delegation, Deference, and Democratic Efficiency

1. Agencies and Agency Costs
Democracy requires information; the voice of an ignorant electorate is a
popular will-o' -the-wisp. 120 Yet the informational link between the people
and the government grows ever more tenuous, at a time when the structure of
government makes it ever more essential. The post-New Deal activist state has
unprecedented power, vested in agencies that often combine executive,
legi slative, an d judicial functions. 121 Not only do these agencies sidestep the
checking device of separation of powers, they also elude direct electoral
control-and thus allow legislators to avoid accountability for decisions
delegated to agencies. 122 Oversight by the elected government produces a
"double agency" situation where the dominant incentive may be not to
ascertain and implemen t the public will but rather to pass off respo nsibility for
unpopular programs. As one Congressman has stated, "When hard deci sio ns

117. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm acy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Cou ncil , 425 U.S. 74 8, 770
( 1976) ("It is precise ly this kind of choice, betwee n the dangers of suppressing information , and the dange rs
of its misuse if it is freel y avai lab le, that the First Amendment makes for us.") ; supra text accompanying
notes 3 1-32.
118. The decisional rule of the utilitarian calculus I abju re is the following: Minimi ze the sum of
mon itori ng expenditures, bonding expenditures, and residua l loss. My claim is that the First Amendme nt
is concerned primarily wi th reducing residual loss alone; although protecting employee speec h may reduce
the sum of the three categories, the Amendment requires this protection in any case as a means to reduce
residu al loss.
11 9. It is true, of course, th at citize ns wi ll often not care what techniques are being employed. In these
situations, they may c losely resemble corporate shareho lders. But their power to exert co nt ro l in the
instances where they do care is preserved on ly by providing in formatio n about all instances. See generally
Blasi, supra note 44 (discussing free express ion's checks on official abuse of power).
120. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 ( 1931 ) ("The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that governmen t may be respons ive to the wi ll of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an oppo rtunity essen tial to the security of the
Republi c, is a fund ame ntal principle of our constituti onal system."); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 16- 19;
Blasi, supra note 44, at 523- 24.
121. For an accou nt of the growth of the ad mini strative state, see Yassky, supra note I02, at 1734-37.
122. See ELY, supra note 80, at 132 ("[B]y refu sing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the so rt
of accountability that is crucial to the intelli gi ble functioning of a democratic republic.").
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ha ve to be made, we pass the buck to the agenc ies with vag ue ly worded
statutes." 123
I do no t mean to suggest th at the individu al citizen lives in the loomin g
shadow of a facel ess and entirely un accountable bureaucracy. Agencies th at
engage in rulemakin g, like the IRS or the SEC, are req uired by the
Administrati ve Procedure Act to involve the public in the process by providing
notice of and permitting comment on their proposed rules. 124 The Sun shine
Act requires that agencies headed by collegial bodies conduct public
meetings. 125 Certainly the elected government exerts considerable control
over agencies: The Pres ident wields power of appointment and removal of
agency heads; both the executive and the legislature exert control over agency
funding; and the legislature has significant powers of investigative
oversight. 126
At the same time, the self-s ufficiency of these devices should not be
overestimated. Many of the governmental entities with which the public
interacts do not engage in rulemaking with its concomitant solicitation of
public opinion. Oversight by nonappropriating committees is "sporadic" and
"unsystematic," usually initiated " not in accordance with any preplanned set
of priorities, but rather in respon se to a newspaper article, a complaint from
a constituent or special interest group, or information from a disgruntled
agency employee." 127 Effective oversight requ ires an informational trigger,
which in many cases may be employee speech.
The question, in the end, is not so much how good or bad the situation is
as whether a given rule makes it better or worse. The elaborate system of
formal and informal oversight that has grown up around the administrative
state runs on informati on. The government may be ready to respond to th e
voice of the people; all the same , if the people are silent, nothing will
happen. 128 As the Waters Court itself noted: "Government employees are
often in th e best positi on to know wh at ails the agencies for which they work;
public debate may gain much from their informed opinions." 129 Becau se the
public 's control over agencies is indirect and requires greater effort, the
importance of readil y available info rmation is increased . 130 One of the most
!23 . 122 CONG . REC. HI 0,685 (daily ed. Sept. 2 1, 1976) (statement of Rep . Lev itas) .
124. See 5 U.S. C. § 553(b)- (c) ( 1994).
125 . See id. § 552(b).
126. Leg islative oversigh t, however, is conduc ted by com mittees , whic h are not necessarily
represent ati ve of Congress in ge neral nor, a fo rti ori , of the publi c will. See JERRY L. MASH AW ET AL. ,
ADMINI STRAT IVE LAW !54 (3d ed. 1992).
127. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON Gov 'T OPERATIO NS, 2 STU DY ON FEDERAL REGULATION:
CO NGRESS IONAL OVERS IGHT OF REGU LATORY AGENC IES 66-67 ( 1977).
128. See Blas i, supra note 44, at 539 (notin g that informed citi ze nry ani mates and fac ilitates
government se lf- regul ati on).
129. Waters v. Churchill , 11 4 S. Ct. 1878, !88 7 (1994).
130. The more diffi cult it is to exerci se co ntrol or to obtain information, the greater the prob lem of
ration al apath y: Dise ngagemen t based on th e calcu lati on that th e cost of obtainin g in fo rm ation exceeds th e
va lue of change mult iplied by the li ke lihood tha t an indi vidual's vote will produce it. Since pu blic con tro l

..
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effective means of producing information about the managemen t of public
organizations may be through the speech of employees. 131
It was suggested earlier that traditional First Amendment rationales might
apply less forcefully to employee speech because government agencies are
overseen by the popularly elected government. 132 This vision of control
flowing from the people to the legislatures and to the agencies (and of
accountability running the other direction) turns out to be somewhat optimistic.
The machinery of popular accountability may exist, but without an animating
flow of information it is dead metal. Thus the structure of modern government,
far from supporting restrictions on employee speech, weighs in the opposite
direction: The delegation of power to agencies makes employee speech more
crucial to democratic legitimacy than the speech of private citizens.
The point can be put more strongly still. If the government created by the
delegation of power is to be a democratic government, it must be susceptible
to popular control. This means that the people must be able to direct the
government, not by second-guessing everyday decisionmaking, but by
intervening in exceptional circumstances when the government goes against the
public will. 133 The performance of this checking function depends on the
public's ability to receive information about the ordinary functioning of
government-both because this information educates the citizen and because
it is the most effective method of revealing governmental divergence from
public desires. This information , however, is produced in large part by the
employee speech that is now restrained in the name of deference to managerial
expertise. The rationale of Waters is thus internally incoherent. The model of
delegation and deference relies for its democratic legitimacy on the very
speech it is invoked to suppress.

2.

Delegation and Distrust

The post-New Deal Supreme Court has been relatively in sensitive to the
problematic relation between delegation and democracy; the Court has not
invalidated a delegation of power on constitutional ground s since 1935. 134
But there is good reason to suppose that the American public is significantly
more sensitive.

of agencies is indirect, the chances of effecting desired change are red uced; thus monitoring costs a re
espec ially significant.
131. The idea that a maj o r purpose o f free speec h is to allow citizens to mo nit or the govern me nt is
ve ry closely rela ted to Blasi's c heck in g va lue. See Blasi, supra note 44, at 634 (suggesting that checking
val ue requires greate r protecti o n fo r public employee speech).
132. See sup ra Subsection I.C.4.
133. See Blasi, supra note 44, at 542-43.
134. See A.L.A. Schec ter Poultry Corp. v. Unite d States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (ho lding delegation o f
legislative powe r in National In dustrial Recovery Ac t to be unc o nstituti ona l).

1260

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1233

Public confidence in government is at a low ebb. People distrust the
government; they also believe it poses a significant threat to their rights. A
recent CNN- Time poll found that 62% of respondents agreed that, "the federal
government has become so powerful that it poses a threat to the rights and
freedoms of ordinary citizens." 135 Forty years ago, 75% of the population
trusted the federal government to "do the right thing most of the time"; now
three-quarters do not. 136 People view the government as an alien entity, a
heteronomous authority rather than an instrument of the public will. From a
psychological perspective, this alienation is certainly troubling. But its effect
is more than psychological; that is, the psychological distance between people
and government becomes a real political distance when alienated citizens drop
out of the political process. 137
It is at least plausible to suppose that public disaffection with
government-and certainly public fear of government-can be attributed in no
small part to the consolidation of immense powers in relatively unaccountable
agencies (consider the FBI, the CIA, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms) and the concomitant perception that citizens have lost control of
government. 138 The various mechanisms of oversight and accountability may
work well to prevent the government from going against the public interest.
Yet it is one thing to say that the government is for the people and quite
another to say that it is by the people. Delegation, regardless of its utilitarian
impact, takes us further from the democratic ideal of a government directly
controlled by the popular voice. 139
This lack of direct accountability may well be an unavoidable feature of
the modern state. Yet inevitability does not mean that the proper response is
acquiescence. It is possible to make the government at least relatively more
accountable and accessible; modern First Amendment jurisprudence has been
interpreted as judicial devotion to just that task. 140 One way to increase
public understanding of and involvement in government is to promote the
availability of information about its internal workings, and one way to do that
is to protect employee speech. A freer flow of information to the public will
improve the controls that do exist and, equally important, help citizens to see

135. Views on the American Scene, NAT'L J., Mar. 2, 1996, at 502, 502.
136. Joannie M. Schrof eta!., Speak Up 1 You Can Be Heard 1, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 19,
1996, at 42.
137. If the public becomes rationally apathetic, agency problems are exacerbated. See supra note 130.
Increasing the flow of infonnation to the public changes the calculus by making it less costly for citizens
to get information; they are thus more likely to be rationally motivated to vote.
138. See 122 CONG. REC. H31 ,633 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Rep. Levitas).
139. For relatively recent criticisms of delegation, see THEODORE J. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM
I 05-07 ( 1979); Peter H. Aranson et a!., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. I, 63-67
( 1982); and Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Conrrol of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,
1127-30 ( 1977).
140. See Yassky, supra note I 02, at 1702-03. The Court has, however, employed a liberty-based
model of the First Amendment, which makes it less effective than it might otherwise be.
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the government as their own creation rather than an alien bureaucracy. The
idea that the government is a threat to individual liberty stems from insufficient
promotion of self-governance.

V. SOLUTIONS
The Note has argued thus far that the analysis employed by the Waters
Court is both incorrectly structured and incorrectly applied. Against the
employee's liberty interest in speech it sets a monolithic concept of
governmental efficiency. Agency theory suggests first that the opposition
between employee speech and even a narrow understanding of governmental
efficiency (task efficiency) is overstated. More importantly, it reveals that
efficiency comprises a self-governance element as well. Employee speech cases
do not feature counterpoised liberty and task efficiency; they implicate selfgovernance (democratic efficiency) also, and while task efficiency arguably
may be reduced by employee speech rights, democratic efficiency is surely
enhanced.
Seen in this light, the case for reduced protection of employee speech
seems much weaker; after all, task efficiency is not even a constitutional value.
The model of delegation and deference does not stand up to normative
scrutiny. Yet there are real differences between employees and nonemployees,
and the government must be allowed to respond to them. The heightened
governmental interest in suppressing employee speech provides sound
normative grounds for some sort of different treatment; what is needed is a
treatment that does not go beyond the descriptive limits suggested by
employee-nonemployee differences. This Part first argues that the public
concern test, and content-based tests generally, do not provide an adequate
means of taking into account the relevant differences and separating the
competing values. It then articulates a test that responds sensitively to the
values at stake and the distinguishing characteristics of employee speech.
A. The Failure of Public Concern
The public concern test, as explained above, 141 employs a peculiar
conftation of self-governance- and liberty-centered models of the First
Amendment. A proper understanding of the interests at stake dictates a much
stronger protection of employee speech. While the public concern test does
distinguish between liberty and self-governance, it does not promote selfgovernance in a way that is sensitive to the unique features of employee
speech.

141. See supra Section III.B.
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Employee speech on matters of public concern promotes task efficiency,
in some cases, 14 2 and democratic efficiency more broadly. Yet the distinctive
value of employee speech is not solely its ability to reveal management
corruption or contribute to existing public debate. As discussed above,
significant devices exist to assist the public in monitoring governmental
agencies. The unique contribution of employee speech is rather its ability to
disclose information about the internal workings of government agencies, on
matters that are not necessarily of public concern, but might become so. This
speech not only promotes task efficiency by revealing waste that is not the
product of corruption; it also promotes democratic efficiency by involving
citizens more directly in the workings of government and giving them the
opportunity to become concerned. 143 As Cynthia Estlund has stated:
[T]he Connick version of the public concern test explicitly discounts
the importance, and undermines the claim to co nstitutional status, of
speech grounded in the real, everyday experience of ordinary
people .... It is primarily through the exchange of information and
views that these individual frustrations, losses, and insights coalesce
to give rise to collective demands on the political process .
. . . . Such a conception of matters of public concern enforces a
truncated vision of public debate and cuts off the roots from the
branch of public discourse and democratic governance. 144
A natural response to this criticism might be to expand the scope of public
concern, or even to argue that its current scope is sufficient, if properly
understood. Yet there are good reasons to think that any content-based test will
be inappropriate to employee speech. A content-based test works by protecting
certain categories of employee speech. There will always be some uncertainty

142. Whether speech on matters of public concern can promote task efficiency depends on how
broadly the category is construed. Governmental corruption is usually deemed a matter of public concern,
and its revelation increases task effic iency. See, e.g., Rookard v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46
(2d Cir. 1983) (stating that exposing corruption in government "obviously involves a matter of public
concern"). Bul see infra note 143 (noting that speech that would ot herw ise be on matters of publi c concern
may lose protection if uttered as part of di spute). Waste or inefficiency that is not a product of corruption
is substantially less likely to be found a matter of public concern. See, e.g ., Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d
434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. From the perspective of arousing public concern it is particularly troubling that courts tend to
"demote" speech that does address matters of public concern when it arises in the context of a personal
dispute. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that officers'
criticism of police chief's administration of emergency response unit is not matter of public concern
because officers expressed personal dissatisfaction with chief); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 193-94 (4th
Cir. 1989) (stating that complaint about conditions at city firing range "arguably touches upon matters of
public concern," but is less protected because plaintiff was "voicing her personal grievances"); Berg v.
Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Although matters of sexual harassment [and] the
misappropriation of college property ... may relate to [the college 's ) efficient performance," plaintiff's
charges did not raise " broader issues of public school administration unrelated to his personal di sputes.")
(citations omitted).
144. Estlund, sttpra note 84, at 37-38.
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about the scope of these protected categories, 145 and so employees will be
unable to be sure in advance whether some speech is protected or not.
Uncertainty creates the familiar First Amendment chilling effect: To avoid the
risk of punishment, speakers stay well within the bounds of protection. Selfcensorship eliminates speech at the margins.
The unusual treatment of employee speech makes the problem of chilling
more severe. Where the ordinary citizen enjoys a broad range of presumptively
protected speech from which "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech" 146 are excluded, the employee faces a narrow range of protected
speech, with the remainder entirely unprotected. This "defining-in"
technique, 147 in contrast to the usual "defining-out," produces chilling at the
core of valuable speech rather than at the periphery. 14 g A background norm
of reduced protection is not a mistake; 149 most employee speech does not
reduce agency costs or contribute to societal self-governance. But any
content-based protected category will produce accentuated chilling. Effective
protection of First Amendment freedoms requires a buffer zone. 150
Additionally, a content-based test that works by identifying "valuable" speech
is perilous from the perspective of democracy: Judicial demarcation of a
category of legitimate subjects of democratic discourse usurps the public
prerogative to set the political agenda. 151
Finally, the public concern test, or any content-based test, is simply not
sensitive to the differences between employees and nonemployees. Some
employee speech, as discussed in Part I, threatens governmental efficiency in
ways that nonemployee speech cannot. 152 Some employee speech is
indistinguishable from nonemployee speech. If it is true, as the Court says, that
taking public employment does not waive First Amendment rights, 153 then
reduced First Amendment protection should be triggered not by the status of
145. The public concern test is a good example of a content-based test whose boundaries are difficult
to administer, as both judges and commentators have noted. See sources cited supra note 84.
146. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ,
147. See Frederick Schauer, Categ ories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acrs, 34 YAN D.
L. REv. 265, 279-82 (1981).
148. See Estlund, supra note 84, at 48.
149. The public concern test actually provides no protection for other speech, which is a mi stake. See
infra text accompanying note 162.
!50. See NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415 , 433 ( 1963). Another way of putting this point is to say that
information is a public good and thus requires subsidies. The overprotection provided by a buffer zone may
be considered a legal subsidy. For a more complete analysis of the public good aspects of speech. see
Daniel Farber, Comment, Free Speech Wit how Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, I 05
HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991 ).
!51. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,538 (1980) ("To allow
a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government
control over the search for political truth."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 ( 1974) ("We
doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges."); POST, mpra note 46, at 165-67;
Estlund, supra note 84, at 2-4.
152. This is either speech that is disruptive as an activity or speech that damages the speaker 's
working relationships and makes her a less effective employee.
!53. See cases cited supra note 33.
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being an employee but by speech that threaten s efficienc y in an employmentrelated way.
Consider the following examples of employee-to-employee speech: "The
Yankees were something else last night" (said in the office); "How can you
work for someone who doesn't like the Yankees?" (said in a bar) ; "How can
you work for a government that abdicates its responsibility to care for the less
fortunate members of society ?" (said upon passage of a welfare reform bill).
All of these have the potential to be disruptive, in the sense of dampening
enthusiasm, but only the first relies for its effect on the fact that the speaker
is an employee. The public concern test would extend nominal protection to
the last remark, but an employer fearing di sruption could fire based on all
three.
This result is very hard to justify without resorting to a waiver theory.
Where employee speech is no different from the speech of the general public ,
the source of the elevated government interest in efficiency is mysterious.
There are differences between employees and nonemployees, and they do
create a heightened government interest in controlling employee speech, but
the differences do not exist every time an employee speaks.
For a last example, note that "I don't like the Yankees" provides sufficient
grounds for dismissal no matter when or where it is uttered . Speech that is not
on a matter of public concern receives no First Amendment protection
whatsoever. This result too is hard to justify without invoking waiver. The
First Amendment interest at stake, the Waters Court says, is the employee's
liberty interest in expression. Yet it is a basic fact of First Amendment
jurisprudence that the expressive liberty interest extends to "Wittgenstein is a
genius" or "Nabokov is divine" (neither of which, unfortunately, is a matter
of public concern) as strongly as it does to "Vote Republican." 154 Here the
public concern test just looks irrational: The liberty interest as it is traditionally
understood is not limited by content, unless the speech constitutes libel,
obscenity, or another disfavored category.
It is difficult to formulate a test that neatly tracks the differences between
employees and nonemployees and also coherently distinguishes the employee's
liberty interest from the societal interest in self-governance. It may be
impossible to create one that does so perfectly. It is not, however, hard to do
a better job of it than the public concern test.
B. A New Test
Employee speech poses a greater danger to governmental efficiency than
nonemployee speech in two cases: where the activity of the speech disrupts the
workplace, and where the content of the speech damages the speaker's working
154. See m pra note 93 .
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re lationships. 155 The former condition will ne ver obtain with respect to offthe-job speech. A reasonable first cut for an employee speech test is thus
whether speech occurs in the workplace or not. Off-the-job speech should
generally receive full First Amendment protection: The government employer
can no more fire an employee for such speech than the sovereign government
could fine or imprison a nonemployee. 156
This first cut locational test has the additional virtue of impinging only
slightly, if at all, on the societal interest in self-governance. If the value of
speech is that it informs the public, there is no reason that it has to occur on
the job. A locational test creates a safe harbor for valuable speech and at the
same time takes the speech away from the area where it can do the most
damage. The heightened government power is restri cted to the area where it
is most natural: the workplace. Rather than bringing the First Amendment into
the workplace, a locational test lets the employee take the speech out.
Protection of working relationships, in response to the second difference
mentioned above, will create a significant exception. "My boss dresses funny,"
said outside the workplace by a member of the rank and file, is protected; said
by a trusted deputy, it is not. There are two concerns that attend this exception.
The first is the danger that employers will allege harm to working relationships
where none exists, the second that real relationships will chill disclosure of
valuable information.
The first concern is relatively insubstantial, since the existence of such
relationships is judicially verifiable. In Wulf v. City of Wichita, 157 the
pl ai ntiff, a police officer, wrote a letter requesting the Kansas Attorney General
to investigate alleged improprieties within the department. LaMunyon , the chief
of police, fired Wulf and claimed at trial that the letter damaged working
relationships. Rejecting his claim, the court stated: 'There was testimony th at
LaMunyon, the person most directly criticized by the letter, was angry and
upset when he learned of the letter, but LaMunyon was not someone with
whom Wulf worked closely or regularly." 158
The second concern is so mewhat more serious. Chilled sartorial satire is
of no great moment ; chilled disclosure of impropriety is another issue . "My
boss is embezzling taxpayer monies," if true, should be protected even if it
comes from a trusted assistant. One response would be to leave the matter up
!55. The existing regime seems to focus on damages to any working relationships. See supra note 37 .
I reject this approach because nonemployee speech can also harm working relationships. If the employee's
speec h is more effective at doing so, thi s is largely a function of hi s superi or information. Informati onal
asymmetry is a point in favor of increased protection of employee speech; unless the information di sc losed
is appropriately confidential (e.g. , troop transport sailing times), its dissemination is a public good.
!56. Of course, a successful prosecution (e.g., for libel ) would certainly provide grounds for dismissal;
the libelous character of speech cou ld also be asserted as justificati on for dismissal withou t a prosecution.
A court 's task in reviewi ng a challenged di sc harge would be to determine whe ther the speech was
punishable under ordinary First Amendment standards.
!57. 883 F.2d 842 (I Oth Cir. 1989).
!58. !d. at 861.
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to the political process; if the impropriety is sufficiently severe, the employer
may be the one fired and the employee would be in no danger. This is an
unreliable protection, however, and a wiser solution may be to permit the
employee to use truth as a defense against termination based on allegations of
breach of public trust. The effect of this is partially to constitutionalize the
Whistleblower Protection Act. 15 9 Since whistleblowing is a paradigm of
valuable speech, constitutional protection does not seem unwarranted. 160
What the locational test creates, then, is a broad realm of protected off-thejob speech with an exception for speech that is harmful because of the
speaker's employment. This tracks the differences between employees and
nonemployees, and should have at most a minor impact on the promotion of
self-governance. On-the-job speech requires different analysis. This speech
typically does not reduce agency costs or serve democratic values in the same
way as off-the-job speech, and if it does it can do so as well off-the-job. 161
Churchill could have voiced her concerns, or Myers distributed her
questionnaire, outside the office. The First Amendment concern raised by
regulation of on-the-job speech is one of liberty rather than self-governance,
and it is a trivial point that employees surrender much of their ordinary liberty
to their employers. The deference the Court grants to employer predictions of
disruption is appropriate for on-the-job speech. However, as noted earlier, the
employee's liberty interest extends to all speech; thus, the restriction of the
liberty-based protection to speech on matters of public concern makes no
sense. Decisions to fire employees for on-the-job speech should be subject to
deferential review, but the public concern test should be abandoned. 162
The above discussion draws with a very broad brush and is susceptible to
misconstruction. It should not be taken to suggest that protected off-the-job
speech can never justify dismissal. In such cases, however, it should be true
that dismissal is based on poor job performance rather than on the speech qua
speech. For example, some speech may call into question the employee's
fitness to perform his job. Racist speech by any government employee whose
racial beliefs could affect job performance (for example, a police officer) might
suggest that the employee was unable to bring a constitutionally mandated

159. 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
160. "My boss's policies, though legitimate, are wasteful" (said by the deputy) is still not protected

under this proposal. Chilling such speech may reduce task eff1ciency; on the other hand, reform is probably
more easily achieved if the deputy speaks to the boss rather than to the public.
161. A result of the locational test is that some speech that should be protected according to an agency
theory analysis will not be if it occurs on the job. This amounts to a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction, which is acceptable from the perspective of ordinary First Amendment theory;
additionally, there is no obvious reason that this restriction would reduce the quantity of valuable employee
speech. In effect, the self-governance interest is preserved by relocation; what is left is simply the
employee's liberty interest.
162. Deferential review will likely approach no review at all, but this result is appropriate where only
a liberty interest is at stake. The managerial interest in task effi ciency should outweigh a liberty interest
in the workplace.
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race-neutrality to his work and thereby justify dismissal. Dismissal in such
cases will follow from the general principle that an employee may be fired for
doing a bad job; the speech itself provides no independent grounds.
The above example, and the exception for harm to working relationships,
suggests that within the protected realm of off-the-job speech there will be
unprotected pockets: roughly, speech that affects an employee's fitness to
perform her job. Although these will be content-based categories, the fact that
they are "defined out" of a protected background (rather than protected pockets
being "defined in") eliminates the accentuated chilling effect of the public
concern test. Similarly, within the largely unprotected realm of on-the-job
speech there must be pockets of protection. For example, speech pursuant to
established procedures requires different analysis. Agency policies might
require that employees first air grievances to their direct superiors; this should
not create a catch-22 where on-the-job speech is unprotected but off-the-job
speech violates regulations and justifies dismissal. This defining-in technique
may well chill workplace speech, but the premise of the locational test is that
valuable workplace speech can be safely transported outside.

VI. CONCLUSION
The arguments for reduced First Amendment protection in the government
workplace are obvious and undeniable: Experts to whom specific tasks are
delegated must have discretion in their pursuit of task efficiency, and liberty
must give way in the managerial domain. But an analysis that casts the issue
as liberty versus efficiency is misleadingly simple. Protection of employee
speech contributes to task efficiency and might be selected by a competitive
market for public agencies; in any case, managers are not the ones who should
decide how much speech to tolerate. More significantly, employee speech
reinforces democratic efficiency and self-governance. The societal interest in
self-governance cannot be defeated by an appeal to managerial discretion
because the model of deference and delegation depends for its democratic
legitimacy on the availability of information to the public . Thus the one area
in which government employers must not be allowed discretion is speech that
provides the public with information about the workings of government.
This Note attempts to disentangle the distinct liberty and self-governance
interests at stake in regulation of employee speech and to reach an
accommodation between the competing demands of managerial government
and democratic society. The solution proposed is by no means a complete
remedy to the problem of agency costs in public institutions. But by protecting
the flow of information to the public, it increases accountability and promotes
the democratic deliberative process that is the First Amendment's chief
concern.

